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This paper examines whether imposing minimum wage alters the characteristics of new 
businesses. Applying a difference-in-differences framework to repeated cross-sectional data of new 
plants, we explore the impact of minimum wage introduction on characteristics of new plants in South 
Korea. We first confirm that the minimum wage introduction induced new plants to have higher 
remuneration to workers. Due to the imposed minimum wage, the new plants tend to start with fewer 
employees and to equip their employees with more capital.  Finally, we find that the minimum wage 
introduction led to higher labor productivity among entering plants.   
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Minimum wage system is a specific form of labor regulation in which a state or a local 
government set and regulate the lowest amount of remuneration that employers must pay to 
workers. As the minimum wage is a regulation on the labor use for employers, a group of 
literature employs firm/establishment-based data to properly understand the impact of 
minimum wage (Bossler and Gerner, 1999; Card and Krueger, 1994; Neumark and Wascher, 
2000; Dube, Naidu, and Reich. 2007; Skedinger, 2006; Haepp and Lin, 2017; Gan, Hernandez 
and Ma 2016; Luca and Luca, 2018; Fan, Lin, and Tang, 2018). Specifically, the impact of 
minimum wage on employment could depend on the margin in which employers adjust to the 
minimum wage. Majorities of the existing studies using employer-based data explore the effect 
of minimum wage on firms which have been operating before the change in minimum wage 
policy. That is, the previous literature focused on how or whether incumbent firms would exit 
from the market or adjust their employment, working hours, profitability or prices in response 
to the change in minimum wage (Aaronson, French and MacDonald. 2008; Harasztosi and 
Lindner. 2018; Huang, Loungani, and Wang. 2014; Stewart and Swaffield. 2006; Draca, 
Machin, and Reenen. 2011; Riley and Bondibene. 2017). 
Given this strand of literature, the purpose of this paper is to extend our understanding 
on minimum wage by focusing on new firms and their characteristics. The investigation on the 
effect of minimum wage on new plants is warranted for two reasons. First, relatively little 
attention has been given in the literature although it could provide important implications 
regarding the long-run effect of the minimum wage (Aaronson et al., 2018). Moreover, the 
aspect of the impact of minimum wage on new firms could differ from what incumbent firms 
would experience. Due to the employment protection law and other adjustment costs stemming 
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from putty-clay nature of technology, incumbent firms are less likely to swiftly adjust their 
characteristics such as employment or capital intensity in response to the change in the 
minimum wage (Sorkin. 2015; Johansen. 1959). However, a minimum wage could have a more 
immediate impact on the characteristics of entering firms not only because entering firms are 
more flexible in terms of choice of labor and capital inputs, but also because minimum wage 
could affect the decision of potential entrepreneurs on whether or not to enter the market in the 
first place (Williamson, 1968: Bachmann, Bauer, and Frings, 2014).  
We exploit the introduction of minimum wage in South Korea in 1988 to identify the 
impact of minimum wage on new plants. In particular, we compare the changes in the 
characteristics of new firms in more affected sectors with those in less affected sectors. Since 
the minimum wage regulates the lowest amount of remuneration that an employer must pay to 
workers, it would have more ‘bite’ on low-paying sectors. The idea is to use the pre-policy 
remuneration to workers before the minimum wage introduction to capture the heterogeneous 
degrees of exposure to the minimum wage across sectors.１ To be more specific, we define the 
intensity of treatment at the sector-level using the fraction of firms in which the average wage 
to workers was below the initial minimum wage,   and apply a generalized difference-in-
differences framework to repeated cross-sectional data of new firms to explore the causal effect 
of minimum wage introduction on various characteristics of new firms.  
We first confirm that the minimum wage introduction in Korea in 1988 was a binding 
regulation for entering firms. Specifically, we document that the average remuneration to 
workers at new plants increased as a result of the minimum wage introduction. We also show 
                                          
１ This methodology was first proposed by Card and Krueger (1994) and subsequently adopted by papers such 
as Draca, Machin, and Reenen (2011) and Riley and Bondibene (2017). 
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that new firms in sectors with a high proportion of plants paying low wages start the business 
with fewer employees due to the minimum wage introduction. Therefore, although the 
minimum wage introduction did not negatively affect the employment of existing firms (Baek 
and Park, 2016), it reduced the employment size of entering firms. Moreover, we document 
that new firms choose to adopt capital intensive technology—i.e. higher capital-to-labor ratio—
due to the minimum wage introduction. We then find empirical evidence supporting that the 
minimum wage introduction has a positive impact on the labor productivity of new firms. 
Specifically, our empirical evidence implies only the entrepreneurs who could make more out 
of the workers choose to enter the market after the minimum wage introduction. Our findings 
regarding the productivity of new firms are consistent with recent literature suggesting that 
minimum wage could enhance overall efficiency of economy by improving the productivity of 
incumbent firms and forcing less productive firms to exit the market. (Riley and Bondibene, 
2017; Luca and Luca, 2018).２ 
We are able to contribute to the literature which uses firm/establishment-level data to 
examine how employers respond to the minimum wage, in two important ways. First, we take 
advantage of the data that cover all the firms which have been subject to the minimum wage 
introduction. As it will be explained in detail in the following sections, the minimum wage in 
Korea was initially applied to establishments with ten or more employees in manufacturing 
sector, and our dataset covers the population of establishments meeting the criteria. Thus, our 
estimates based on the population of firms being subject to the introduction would be more 
                                          
２ Riley and Bondibene (2017) exploits the minimum wage introduction and increase in minimum wage in the 
U.K. to examine its impact on productivity. They find that the productivity of firms employing low-wage 
workers, increased with the minimum wage. Luca and Luca (2018) finds that restaurants with lower ratings are 
more likely to go out of businesses by minimum wage increase. 
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representative than those in other studies based on a sample of firms that are affected by the 
minimum wage. In particular, firm-level analyses regarding the effect of minimum wage 
mostly exploit firm-level surveys underrepresent the firms being affected by the minimum 
wage due to the nature of the firm-level surveys. To be specific, firm-level data with detailed 
information such as revenue, wage, and employment is usually collected for sufficiently large 
firms.３ Therefore, compared to the previous works employing firm-level data, our work is 
less likely to suffer from the bias stemming from the underrepresentation of the firms being 
affected by the minimum wage. 
Second, to the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to examine the impact of 
minimum wage on the characteristics—i.e. employment, capital intensity and labor 
productivity—new firms entering the market. There are a few papers that examine the impact 
on the entry of businesses. For instance, Rohlin (2011) finds that non-trivial negative impact 
of minimum wage on entry of new establishments, whereas Aaronson et al. (2018) shows that 
the entry rate increases due to due to the minimum wage. However, such papers did not 
examine the impact of minimum wage on the characteristics of new firms which have chosen 
to enter the market. Exploring the characteristics of new firms is important as it allows us to 
draw implications regarding the long-term consequence of the minimum wage introduction. In 
particular, by documenting the capital-deepening as a possible channel for productivity 
improvement of entering firms, we are able shed light on the long-term impact of minimum 
wage on employment adjustment. Since the characteristics of new firms shape the 
                                          
３ For instance, Mayneris, Poncet, and Zhang (2018) uses Chinese data that surveys firms with at least 5 million 
Yuan sales. As a result, the data covers only 20% of all industrial firms and it is likely to leave out small firms 
that are severely affected by the increase in the minimum wage. Similarly, the previous studies using FAME 
(Financial Analysis Made Easy) database in the U.K. are likely to exclude small companies from their analysis 
(Draca, Machin, and Reenen, 2011; Riley and Bondibene, 2017). 
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characteristics of an industry and the economy, our results suggest that the minimum wage 
introduction would eventually increase per-worker output at the cost of employment reduction. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides detailed description 
of minimum wage introduction in South Korea. Section 3 provides a description of the data 
used in the analysis, followed by the discussion on the empirical model. Section 4 presents the 
main result along with various robustness checks. Sections 5 concludes. 
 
2 Background 
The introduction of the minimum wage in Korea has many unique features that provide a useful 
analytic framework. Although the Labor Standards Act was enacted in 1953 to secure and 
improve the living standards of workers, there was no explicit minimum wage law in Korea 
until 1986. After considerable debate and discussion on the details of the law, the National 
Assembly of Korea promulgated the Minimum Wage Act in December 1986 to reduce the low-
wage labor and improve workers’ life.   
In particular, the law stipulated the first minimum wage to be determined in 1987 by 
the Minimum Wage Council and the initial minimum wage to be applied starting in January 1, 
1988. As it is not hard to imagine, there were oppositions about the introduction of minimum 
wages from businesses and entrepreneurs. In particular, there was a concern that the minimum 
wage introduction would hurt the small businesses at the margin to exit the market. Reflecting 
their concerns, the Article 3 of Minimum Wage Act stated that the minimum wage could be 
gradually introduced by the sizes and industries of establishments. On July 1, 1987, the 
Presidential Decree No. 12207 was announced and limited the establishments being affected 
by the minimum wage to those in the manufacturing sector with ten or more workers.  
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Although the minimum wage introduction was limited to the specific sector, it was not 
expected to be revoked. Specifically, the revised Constitution which was amended on October 
29, 1987 clearly states the requirement of a minimum wage system in Article 32. Therefore, 
despite the fierce oppositions, the minimum wage introduction had been perceived as 
irreversible policy for both employers and workers since it was stipulated in the Constitution.   
The inaugural minimum wage level was supposed to be decided by the Minimum 
Wage Council no later than December 15, 1987. However due to a large disagreement among 
the council members representing employers and workers, the first minimum wage was finally 
decided on December 24, 1987. The initial minimum wage was decided separately for two 
groups of industries within manufacturing sector although the difference was minimal. For the 
low-paying manufacturing industries denoted as “Group 1” the minimum wage was determined 
to be 111,000 KRW per month or 462.50 KRW per hour.４ The initial minimum wage for the 
rest of the manufacturing sector, “Group 2”, was decided to be 117,000 KRW per month or 
487.50 KRW per hour. The initial minimum wage was approximately 33% of the median wage 
of full-time workers in 1988 (OECD, 2019).５  About 4.2% of the workers employed in 
manufacturing plants with ten or more employees were estimated to be paid below than the 
initial minimum wage level in 1988.   
  The Korean context provides two advantages to explore the aspect of minimum 
wage in which the previous literature has paid less attention despite its importance. First, it 
enables us to observe how the developing economy adapts to a newly established labor market 
                                          
４ The Group 1 consists of 12 low-paying industries such as manufacture of food and textiles, based on the three 
digit code of Korean Standard Industry Classification (KSIC) revision 5. 
５ The minimum wage level relative to the median wage of full-time workers was similar to countries such as 
Japan and the United States in 1988. For instance, the federal minimum wage level in the United States was 
35% of the median wage of the full-time workers in 1988. 
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institution regulating the minimum wage level. Most empirical studies in the literature analyze 
the employer’s adjustment to the increase in minimum wage level given that there was a 
minimum wage system previously introduced to the economy. In contrast, the minimum wage 
introduced in 1988 in Korea provides an opportunity to examine how the characteristics of new 
businesses alter in response to a discrete change in labor market institution which did not seem 
be revoked or reversed. In particular, the impact of the imposition of a new labor market 
regulation could be different from the impact of the change in the level of regulation which is 
already established. Moreover, unlike the recent minimum wage introduction in Germany and 
U.K. where it was introduced to well-developed countries, minimum wage in South Korea was 
implemented when it was a developing country. Specifically, most of the previous studies on 
the introduction of minimum wage focus on the experience of the U.K. and Germany that 
introduced the national level minimum wage in 1999 and 2015, respectively (Machin, Manning, 
and Rahman, 2003; Machin and Wilson 2004; Stewart. 2002, 2004b; Dickens and Manning, 
2004; Ahlfeldet, Roth, and Seidel, 2018; Bossler and Brosziet. 2017; Caliendo et al., 2018). In 
particular, the impact of the minimum wage introduction could be different along the course of 
the economic development. Therefore, documenting the impact of minimum wage introduction 
on developing countries could extend our understanding on the impact and leads to the second 
point.  
The second advantage comes from the fact that the minimum wage legislation initially 
targeted the manufacturing sector of a developing country. The existing literature, especially 
the ones exploiting the empirical setting of the U.S., has mainly focused on selected service 
sector which are heavily dependent on low-wage labor such as restaurant and fast-food 
industries (Aaronson, 2001; Aaronson and French, 2007; Card and Krueger 1994;   Dube, 
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Lester, and Reich, 2010, 2016; Luca and Luca, 2018; Kim and Taylor, 1995; Wang, Phillips, 
and Su, 2019; Rohlin, 2011). The high attention to these industries reflects the importance of 
services industry in developed countries. In many developing countries, however, low-wage 
manufacturing still serves as the driving force of growth and also suffers from the “sweatshop” 
working conditions. Specifically, it is well known that main feature of the rapid economic 
growth in Korea was an increase in international trade of manufacturing goods (Connolly and 
Yi, 2015). Therefore, documenting the impact of minimum wage on manufacturing sector is 
particularly important in developing countries as it would have a direct implication on the 
economic development and growth. Moreover, it should also be noted that measuring the 
output, and therefore the labor productivity, and observing production technology represented 
by capital-labor ratio is more straightforward in manufacturing than in service sector. In 
particular, the possibility of price pass-through which complicates the interpretation of the 
result regarding the labor productivity is less likely to occur in manufacturing sector exposed 
in the fierce global competition (Harasztosi and Lindner, 2018). This allows the paper to have 
reliable implications on the impact of minimum wage introduction on various characteristics 
of new plants which are not limited to the employment size of the establishments.  
 
3 Data and Empirical Strategy 
 
To examine the impact of minimum wage introduction on characteristics of entering 
establishments, we use the Mining and Manufacturing Survey from 1984 to 1990. The data is 
collected by Statistics Korea and covers all the establishments with ten or more workers in 
manufacturing sector in which the minimum wage in Korea was initially applied to. Therefore, 
we are able to reliably examine the impact of the minimum wage introduction by utilizing all 
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establishments that were directly subject to the introduction.６ In particular, our empirical 
results are based on a large and representative sample from the survey which does not 
systematically omit the information of small firms.  
The data has detailed information on plant’s characteristics such as the number of 
workers, output, amount of physical capital, total wage to workers and its industry 
classification. The information allows us to examine the effect of the minimum wage 
introduction on plant’s characteristics—labor productivity and capital intensity—other than 
traditionally examined employment size. In particular, output observed in the dataset measures 
the monetary value of goods produced by a given plant in a given year. The amount of physical 
capital is a monetary value of the depreciable tangible assets such as machinery, equipment, 
tools, vehicles, and buildings, and we use the average values of capital stock at the beginning 
of the year and at the end of the year to adjust for the possible investment and depreciation. 
The average monthly wage at a plant is defined as the total wage paid to workers divided by 
12 months and by the number of workers at a plant in a given year. We use this information to 
define the heterogeneous impact of minimum wage introduction across sectors. To be specific, 
we define the treatment intensity as the proportion of plants in each sector at which the average 
monthly wage in year 1987—prior to the minimum wage implementation—was lower than the 
minimum wage (referred to as “low-wage plants”).７ That is, a sector with a large proportion 
of low-wage plants (referred to as “low-paying sector”) would have been affected by the 
minimum wage introduction more than sectors with a small proportion of low-wage plants 
                                          
６The manufacturing sector in our sample is defined by Korean Standard Industrial Classification (KSIC) revision 
5 which is mainly based on International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) revision 2 published by United 
Nations. 
７ The sector is defined at the 4-digit level of KSIC revision 5, and there are 104 sectors in our sample. 
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(referred to as “high-paying sector”). Figure 1, depicts the distribution the treatment intensity 
across the sectors.  
To analyze the impact of minimum wage introduction on the characteristics of entering 
plants by employing the aforementioned measure on the impact, we use repeated cross-
sectional data of new plants which were established in each year of survey. Specifically, our 
analysis regarding the impact of the minimum wage introduction is based on 51,706 new plants 
with more than ten workers in manufacturing sector. Table 1 presents the summary statistics 
for our main sample described above. Specifically, Panel A summaries key variables in the 
entire data whereas Panels B and C describe those variables among the plants that entered prior 
to the minimum wage introduction and after the introduction, respectively. The number of 
workers denotes the average number of employees of a given plant during the year. The annual 
output per worker in each establishment, which reflects the labor productivity, is annual output 
divided by the number of workers,８ Finally, capital per worker, measuring capital intensity, 
is capital-to-labor ratio which is defined as the amount of capital stock divided by the number 
of employees in a given plant. Compared to the numbers observed during the periods prior to 
the minimum wage introduction, monthly wage per worker, capital stock per worker and annual 
output per worker increased and the number of workers decreased during the periods after the 
policy implementation.  
We use the aforementioned sample to examine the effect of minimum wage 
introduction on the characteristics of entering plants by implementing a difference-in-
differences framework. In particular, we analyze how the minimum wage affected the 
                                          
８ The annual output at a plant in a year is a real value which was normalized by the industry specific deflator 
for the value-added.    
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characteristics of new plants differentially across industries by the heterogeneous degree of the 
minimum wage impact. Our empirical strategy is similar to the one adopted in recent literature 
such as Draca, Machin, and Reenen (2011) and Riley and Bondend. Specifically, the changes 
observed among new plants in low-paying sectors relative to those among plants in high-paying 
sectors can be attributed to the introduction of minimum wage. Unlike in a conventional 
difference-in-differences, in which the sample is divided into a treatment group and a control 
group, we employ a continuous treatment intensity, which takes a larger value for low-paying 
(more affected) sectors and a smaller value for high-paying (less affected) sectors.  
To be concrete, we estimate the following equation to examine the causal effect of 
minimum wage introduction on the characteristics of new plants: 
 
𝑌௜௝௧ ൌ 𝛽𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡௝ ∙ 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟௧ ൅ 𝛾௝ ൅ 𝜏௧ ൅ 𝛿௝ ∙ 𝑡 ൅ 𝜙𝐺௧ ∙ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡௝ ൅ 𝜀௜௝௧ (1) 
 
where 𝑌௜௝௧ indicates a characteristic of new plant 𝑖, in sector 𝑗, at year 𝑡 such as the number 
of workers, labor productivity, and capital intensity. 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡௝ denotes the treatment intensity, 
which is defined using the average monthly wage to workers prior to the minimum wage 
introduction as above. As a sector with a large proportion of plants with the average monthly 
wage to workers below the minimum wage tends to be highly affected by the minimum wage 
introduction, the treatment intensity represents the heterogeneity in actual ‘bite’ of the 
minimum wage across sectors. In the following section, we also provide results using 
alternative treatment intensities such as a negative log of average wage of workers following 
Draca, Machin, and Reenen (2011).９   
                                          
９ As additional robustness checks, we provide results employing various alternative treatment intensity in 
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 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟௧ is a dummy variable indicating the periods after the minimum wage 
introduction. That is, 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟௧ takes value equal to one for new plants that entered the market 
after the introduction of minimum wage in 1988. The coefficient of the interaction term 
between 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟௧  and 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡௝ , 𝛽,  is the coefficient of interest; it summarizes how the 
minimum wage introduction alters the characteristics of new plants. 𝛾௝  and 𝜏௧  indicate 
sector-fixed and year-fixed effects, respectively. In addition, we control for the possibility of 
heterogeneous trends across different sectors by including the sector-specific linear time trend, 
𝛿௝𝑡. Furthermore, we control for the possibility of the macro-economic shocks which could 
affect differentially low-paying sectors and high-paying sectors. To explicitly address this issue, 
we include the interaction terms between the real GDP growth rate and the treatment intensity 
of each sector, following the approach used in Kugler and Pica (2008). Finally, the error term, 
𝜀௜௝௧ is clustered at the sector level to address the potential serial correlation within a sector. 
 
4 Results 
4.1 Main Result 
In this section, we document how the minimum wage introduction shaped the characteristics 
of new establishments. Specifically, the introduction of minimum wage could induce firms 
with higher labor productivity to enter the market, and deter the entries of less productive firms. 
Moreover, new plants could choose labor saving technology in response to the minimum wage 
when entering the market. They could also adopt better management practice to improve labor 
productivity and compensate for the increase in labor cost induced by the minimum wage. We 
                                          
Table 3 of Section 4.2. 
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examine the plausibility of these based on the results from estimating the equation (1).   
Table 2 presents the regression results from the equation (1) using various dependent 
variables, summarizing the impact of minimum wage introduction on new plants’ 
characteristics. All regressions include industry-fixed effects at 4 digit level and year-fixed 
effects, industry specific linear trends and the interaction term between real GDP growth rate 
and the treatment intensity. 
Column (1) of Table 2 shows the impact of minimum wage introduction on the average 
monthly wage of workers of entering plants. If the imposition of the minimum wage was a 
binding regulation and our treatment intensity appropriately captures the impact, we would 
expect to observe a positive and statistically significant estimate of 𝛽 in equation (1). The 
estimated coefficient is 0.612 and statistically significant. That is, the monthly wage per worker 
at new plants in the sector that consists of only low-wage plants, increased by 61% as a result 
of minimum wage introduction than that in a sector without any plants paying below the 
minimum wage.  
This result shows that the minimum wage introduction indeed had a positive impact 
on the average remuneration of new firms. Furthermore, the positive coefficient also confirms 
that our treatment intensity adequately captures the degree of effect of minimum wage 
introduction. Therefore, one can safely rule out the possibility that our remaining results on 
employment, capital intensity and labor productivity are due to non-compliance of the 
minimum wage. 
The result in column (2) of Table 2 summarizes the effect of the minimum wage 
introduction on the employment size of new plants. The negative coefficient implies that new 
firms entering the market after the minimum wage imposition tend to start with fewer 
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employees than new firms entering the market prior to the policy. To be specific, entering firms 
in a sector with 1 percentage point higher proportion of low-wage plants, launched their 
business with approximately 1% fewer employees because of the minimum wage introduction. 
This result suggests that the minimum wage introduction could have a negative impact on the 
number of jobs because of the reduced number of jobs created by newly entering firms. 
Column (3) documents the impact of the minimum wage on the capital intensity of 
entering plants measured by the capital to labor ratio. The estimated coefficient capturing the 
effect of the minimum wage on the capital intensity is positive and statistically significant, 
which indicates that the minimum wage induces new firms to adopt more capital intensive 
technology when starting their business. Overall, the results from columns (2) and (3) suggest 
that new firms substitute capital for labor and choose more capital intensive and more labor-
saving technology when entering the market as the minimum wage introduction permanently 
affects the labor costs.   
We also examine how the minimum wage introduction affects the labor productivity 
of new plants. The positive and statistically significant coefficient in column (4) of Table 2 
shows that the minimum wage introduction leads to higher labor productivity among entering 
plants. That is, the change of the labor productivity among new plants in a more affected sector, 
is greater than that in a less affected sector. This result suggests that a modest minimum wage 
could spur productivity improvement by the entries of “better” plants. Although we cannot pin 
down the exact mechanism for the improvement of the labor productivity, there are several 
possible explanations as the increase in the labor productivity can be led by various sources 
such as technology and/or management skills. This finding, the minimum wage introduction 
causing higher labor productivity, could be explained by new plants’ choice of technology 
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and/or their management skills. Besides, new plants could hire higher quality of labor inputs 
and/or they could choose to produce products with a higher value. Compared to the situation 
before the minimum wage introduction, better prepared entrepreneurs could have entered to 
the market in the first place.  
 
4.2 Robustness Checks 
In this subsection, we perform various robustness checks for our main results. We perform 
three different sets of robustness checks. First, we try various measures of treatment intensity 
to show whether our main results are robust to the definitions of treatment intensity. Second, 
we impose an imaginary introduction of minimum wage to examine whether our results are 
simply driven by the pre-existing trend. Furthermore, we restrict the sample to the plants in 
industries with positive values of treatment intensity to see whether industries without any 
low wage plants drive our main findings.  
To begin with, we use four alternative measures for the treatment intensity of the 
minimum wage introduction, and the results are reported in Panels A through D of Table 3. 
First, Panel A of Table 3 uses the proportion of workers working at low-wage plants in each 
sector instead of the proportion of low-wage plants. When using the proportion of low-wage 
plants in each sector for the treatment intensity, we weight each plant in a sector equally. 
Instead, we weight each plant by the size of its employment to construct the alternative 
measure of treatment intensity, assuming the wages of workers within each plant are same. 
This alternative measure allows large firms to influence more in determining the ‘bite’ of the 
minimum wage introduction in each sector. The empirical result using this alternatively 
constructed treatment intensity is both qualitatively and quantitatively consistent with our 
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main result documented in Table 2.  
We adopt another alternative measure for the treatment intensity by taking a natural 
log of the average wage of workers in each sector. The average wage of each sector is 
calculated by dividing the sum of total wage in each sector with the sum of employees in the 
sector. Following the Draca et al. (2011), we use a negative of the logarithm of the average 
wage in a sector so that the sign of the estimated coefficient is consistent with our main 
treatment intensity. The estimated coefficients from using this treatment intensity, 
summarized in Panel B of Table 3, are also qualitatively similar to our main result.  
In addition, we take the average of the proportion of low-wage plants in each sector 
over the time periods prior to the introduction of the minimum wage—years from 1984 
through 1987—to construct an alternative measure for the treatment intensity. In particular, 
we normalize the wages in each year to the year 1987 and identify the share of plants paying 
below the initial minimum wage determined in 1987. We then average the share for each 
industry over the period from year 1984 to 1987 and use it as an alternative treatment 
intensity. From the results based on this treatment intensity, we show that our main result is 
not driven by the wage distribution specific to the year of 1987. Panel C of Table 3 
summarizes the impact of the minimum wage introduction on various outcome variables 
using the treatment intensity defined based on the wage distribution from entire periods prior 
to the policy.   
Finally, we also use a different minimum wage cutoff to determine the proportion of 
plants below the minimum wage in each sector to show that our results are robust to the 
minor change in wage cutoff which determines the treatment intensity. Specifically, we use a 
minimum wage cutoff, 1.2 times higher than the actual minimum wage and determine the 
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treatment intensity based on the higher cutoff. The result reported in Panel D of Table 3 is 
consistent with our main result, and thus confirms that our main results are robust to small 
change in minimum wage cutoff. 
Moreover, we use the pseudo year of minimum wage introduction to examine 
whether our result simply reflects the pre-existing trend in terms of technology adoption and 
the increase of wage and labor productivity of workers. Since South Korea was growing 
rapidly during this period, it is possible that the result could have been observed without the 
minimum wage introduction. To formally examine this possibility, we use the data periods 
only prior to the minimum wage introduction—from 1981 through 1987—and impose an 
imaginary minimum wage introduction in year 1985 instead of 1988. We also adjust the 
treatment intensity to reflect the timing of the imaginary minimum wage introduction. Using 
the wage distribution in 1984, we calculate the proportion of low-wage plants in each sector 
in 1984 for the pseudo-impact of minimum wage introduction. The results using the 
imaginary introduction of minimum wage are presented in Panel E of Table 3. The impact of 
the imaginary introduction of minimum wage in 1985 on the same set of outcome variables 
employed in our main analysis helps us to refute the argument that our main results would 
have been observed in the absence of the minimum wage introduction. Column (1) shows 
that the monthly wage of workers is not affected by the pseudo treatment. The estimates 
shown in columns (2) and (3) have opposite signs of those in the main result, and they are 
statistically insignificant. The estimate for labor productivity in column (4) is positive, but 
much smaller than that in the main result and it is also statistically insignificant. From these 
results, we can be assured that our main results are neither identifying a spurious relation 
between the increase in the wage and productivity nor simply capturing simple trends in the 
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course of economic development.  
 Finally, we limit the sample to sectors with at least some proportion of plants 
paying below the minimum wage level. In particular, sectors without any plants paying below 
the minimum wage may be different from sectors with many low wage plants in many 
aspects. From this exercise, we could examine, conditional on being affected by the minimum 
wage in some degree, whether entering plants in high-paying sectors would change their 
characteristics more substantially because of the minimum wage introduction. The results 
reported in Panel F of Table 3 are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to our main results, 
implying that our findings are valid when sectors without any low wage plants are excluded.    
   
 
5 Conclusions 
In this paper, we try to extend our understanding on minimum wage by examining its 
impact on various characteristics of new plants. Despite the important implications regarding 
the long-run impact, the studies documenting the impact of minimum wage on newly entering 
firms are limited. To explore the causal impact of the minimum wage introduction, we exploit 
the introduction of minimum wage in Korea. To be specific, we apply a generalized difference-
in-differences framework to the data covering the universe of the new plants subject to the 
minimum wage introduction in Korea, utilizing heterogeneous degrees of exposure to the 
minimum wage introduction across sectors. Our estimation results show that the minimum 
wage introduction reduced low-wage labor by increasing wages of workers. Moreover, we find 
that new firms tend to adopt more capital-intensive technology and employ fewer workers due 
the minimum wage. We also find that labor productivity of new firms which chose to enter the 
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market increased with the introduction of minimum wage. Our main results are confirmed by 
various robustness checks which include a falsification test and alternative definitions of degree 
of exposure to the minimum wage. Our results suggest that minimum wage in developing 
countries could induce its manufacturing sector to utilize the labor force in a more efficient 
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Table 1 Summary Statistics 
Variable N Mean SD
  (1) (2) (3)
Panel A: New Plants with 10+ Workers, 1984-1990 
monthly wage per worker 51706 0.24 0.14
number of workers 51706 32.8 75.3
capital stock per worker 51706 4.2 9.6
annual output per worker 51706 28.8 50.4
capital stock 51706 206.7 3458.6
annual output 51706 1114.2 7076.8
 Panel B: New Plants with 10+ Workers, 1984-1987 
monthly wage per worker 25003 0.18 0.09
number of workers 25003 35.5 81.5
capital stock per worker 25003 2.7 5.9
annual output per worker 25003 22.3 35.6
capital stock 25003 148.9 3777.5
annual output 25003 965.4 7852.9
 Panel C: New Plants with 10+ Workers, 1988-1990 
monthly wage per worker 26703 0.30 0.15
number of workers 26703 30.3 68.8
capital stock per worker 26703 5.7 11.8
annual output per worker 26703 34.9 60.4
capital stock 26703 260.9 3129.7
annual output 26703 1253.4 6260.5
1. Panel A reports the statistics for the full sample, and Panels B and C report, respectively, the statistics of the 
subsamples containing plants that entered prior to the minimum wage introduction and plants that entered after 
it, respectively. The numbers in column (1) show the number of observations in each variable. The numbers in 
column (2) and (3) indicate the average and the standard deviation, respectively.  
2. All monetary values are in million KRW.  
3. Output per worker and total output are real, and the remaining variables in monetary values are nominal. 





Table 2 Effect of Minimum Wage Introduction on Characteristics of Entering Plants 
Dependent Var. Wage/L L K/L Y/L 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  Treat=Share of affected plants in each industry in 1987 
Treat*After 0.612*** -0.968*** 1.237*** 1.170***  -0.1421 -0.1333 -0.3806 -0.2229    
adj. R-sq 0.237 0.075 0.289 0.169 
N 51706 51706 51706 51706 
1. The numbers in the main entry indicate the coefficient of Treat*After in equation (1).  Treat is the intensity of treatment 
defined as the proportion of low-wage plants of which the average wage per worker in each sector in 1987 is less than the 
initial minimum wage, and After is a dummy variable indicating periods after the minimum wage introduction 1988. 
2. All dependent variables are in logarithm.  
3. For all dependent variables, we include 4 digit industry-fixed effects, year-fixed effects, industry specific linear trends, and 
the interaction term between real GDP growth rate and Treat.  
4. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at 4 digit industry level.  





Table 3 Robustness Checks 
Dependent Var. Wage/L L K/L Y/L 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A: Treat=Share of employees hired by the affected plants in each industry in 1987 
Treat*After 0.681*** -1.161*** 1.625*** 1.262***  (.16) (.2115) (.5094) (.2309) 
adj. R-sq 0.237 0.075 0.289 0.169 
N 51706 51706 51706 51706    
Panel B: Treat=(-1)*ln(industry average wage in 1987)  
Treat*After 0.134** -0.215** 0.0979 0.178  (.0539) (.0865) (.1731) (.1115) 
adj. R-sq 0.237 0.075 0.288 0.169 
N 51706 51706 51706 51706    
Panel C: Treat=Average of share of affected plants in each industry during 1984-1987 
Treat*After 0.471*** -0.923*** 0.791 0.934***  (.107) (.1425) (.5493) (.1806) 
adj. R-sq 0.237 0.075 0.288 0.169 
N 51706 51706 51706 51706 
   
Panel D: Treat=Share of affected plants in each industry in 1987, using 1.2*actual MW cutoff 
Treat*After 0.492*** -0.796*** 0.845* 0.979***  (.1061) (.1437) (.43) (.1761) 
adj. R-sq 0.237 0.075 0.289 0.169 
N 51706 51706 51706 51706 
   
Panel E: Imaginary year of MW introduction in 1985, using data during 1981-1987 
Treat*After -0.273 0.751 -0.575 0.130  (.3625) (.5239) (.4557) (.4609) 
adj. R-sq 0.119 0.085 0.228 0.145 
N 28917 28917 28917 28917 
   Panel F: Using plants in industries with positive values of Treat 
Treat*After 0.587*** -0.938*** 1.282*** 1.157***  (.1348) (.134) (.3639) (.2196) 
adj. R-sq 0.237 0.075 0.287 0.168 
N 51317 51317 51317 51317 
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1. Treat in Panel A is the proportion of workers at low-wage plants, paying below the minimum wage on average, in each 
sector in 1987. Treat in Panel B is a negative log of the average wage in each sector in 1987. Treat in Panel C is the average 
of the proportion of low-wage plants, paying below the minimum wage on average, in each sector during the periods prior 
to MW introduction, i.e. 1984-1987. Treat in Panel D is the proportion of low-wage plants, paying below 1.2 times initial 
minimum wage on average, in each sector in 1987. Treat in Panel E is the proportion of plants, paying below the minimum 
wage on average, in each sector in 1984. Treat in Panel F is identical to Treat used in the main analysis in Table 2. After in 
all panels but Panel E is an indicator variable taking one for periods after the minimum wage introduction in 1988. After in 
Panel E is an indicator variable taking one for periods after the imaginary introduction of minimum wage, 1985.  
2. The sample used in Panels A through D are identical to the sample used in our main analysis. The sample used in Panel E 
contains new plants with 10 or more employees from 1981 through 1987. The sample used in Panel F contains plants with 
10 or more employees in industries with positive values of Treat, excluding industries without any low-wage plants from 
the main sample.  
3.  For all dependent variables, we include 4 digit industry-fixed effects, year-fixed effects, industry specific linear trends, 
and the interaction term between real GDP growth rate and Treat.  
4. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the 4 digit industry level.  
5. *Statistically significant at the 10% level; ** at the 5% level; *** at the 1 % level.   
 
